INITIAL GENERAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CONSULTA-TIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AGAINST THE SUBVER-SIVE ACTION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM, Submitted to the Council of the OAS, April 30, 1962 (Excerpts)25

Introduction

The instructions received from the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of the Organization of American States with respect to this first report were brief, to the effect that the Committee should submit to the Council no later than May 1, 1962, "an initial general report, with pertinent recommendations regarding measures that should be taken."26 In following these instructions, and in view of the vastness and complexity of communist action, the first problem was to determine the type of report that would be most useful at this

As the problem was studied, the solution became clear. It emerged from the consideration of three ostensible incongruities that are at once revealed upon analyzing, first, communist intentions; second; communist methods; and third, the communist danger.

With respect to communist intentions, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared at Punta del Este that they had been able "to verify that the subversive offensive of communist governments, their agents, and the organizations that they control, has increased in intensity. They added that the purpose of this offensive is "the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers."27 Here the incongruity lies in the fact that citizens of free countries of this hemisphere tolerate, or are inclined to tolerate and support, known communists.

With respect to communist methods, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared that in order to "... hide their true intentions, the communist governments and their agents exploit the legitimate needs of the less-favored sectors of the population ... " and that "with the pretext of defending popular interests, freedom is suppressed, democratic institutions are destroyed, human rights are violated, and the individual is subjected to materialistic ways of life imposed by the dictatorship of a single party." Nonetheless, citizens of free countries of this hemisphere cooperate, or are inclined to cooperate, with known

With respect to the magnitude of the communist danger, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs declared that communist subversion constitutes "one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries." Nevertheless, prominent persons in the hemisphere underestimate, or persist in underestimating, the communist danger, maintaining that it is easy to control since the number of communists in the hemisphere is still small.

See par. 2(c) of Res. II contained in doc. III-12, ante...
These quotations are from Res. I, 4bid.

^{**}OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/X/II.1/Rev.2 (English).

It is appropriate to ask what causes these incongruities. The reply can be given in a single word: deceit. Lacking sufficient numerical strength and without Soviet and Chinese communist military forces close enough to this hemisphere to give them support, the com-munists are dangerous only to the extent that they usurp the strength of others; that is, the students, workers, rural workers, writers, and even political leaders. Since the great majority of the citizens of the Americas believe in the ideals of national independence and individual liberty, and reject intervention and dictatorship, the communists can strengthen themselves, and even come into power, only through a program of deceit that assumes many and varied forms. Only thus can communist subversion triumph.

The Committee believes that at this time it would best accomplish its mission by submitting an initial general report in which the various

communist techniques of deceit are described.

These communist techniques deserve careful study. Therefore this report presents certain data and gives some examples that should help any genuinely patriotic and alert observer to analyze communist words and action and to protect his country against them. It also offers some recommendations on measures that should be taken in order effectively to counter the subversive action of international communism and thus to strengthen the defense system of the hemisphere. In this connection, aware that many citizens and organizations of our hemisphere are zealously engaged in numerous activities designed to achieve social, economic, and political progress on the basis of national independence and respect for individual liberty, the members of this Com mittee have undertaken the task assigned to them with the hope that their contribution may be an important part of the total effort. resembly pall ris

Conclusions on the long Sparslet of Lentler trace and the conclusions

The synthesis made in this Chapter on the communist movement enables us to draw some conclusions about its true nature and the strategy of destruction that it uses:

.1. The communist parties of America are international in character and are subject to the directives that issue from Moscow. Direction of the movement is carried on in accordance with resolutions adopted at congresses, meetings, and conferences of the Communist Party of the USSR and related agencies and parties.

2. The communist parties of America and their members have pledged themselves not to fight in defense of their countries if they

should be attacked by the USSR.

3. The directive body of the communist apparatus began in 1952 to intensify its action with respect to the communist parties of America, assuming the direction and making plans for the offensive in the American hemisphere. General action has become more intensive? as a consequence of the events in Cuba.

4. In the leadership of the American communist parties, the tactic presently employed is that of keeping the principal leaders concealed and using as a front persons whose notoriety as communists lessens their effectiveness. This tactic enables them to infiltrate agents into key positions in the political, economic, and social organizations of the American countries. This is an element of grave danger to the independence and democratic systems of these nations.

5. Since 1945 international communism has made very wide use of "frontism", based on front (or facade) organizations to promote action that will favor its aims. This action tends chiefly toward the creation of "fronts" that may cover various fields, such as "Peace Front", "Labor Front", or "Student Front", their outstanding char-

acteristic being that they are regarded as non-communist.

6. Communism exploits the logical desire of the peoples to seek solutions for their problems—problems that are evident and that, furthermore, stand in urgent need of solution. Through the tactics of deceit, communism takes advantage of social realities so that when the moment arrives in which governments are approaching solutions in the national interest, it creates obstacles to any measures which, precisely because they are suitable, would deprive it of its battle cry.

7. Communism adapts to the environment and creates conflicts or intensifies existing situations, seeking party members and "fellow travelers" (these latter being more numerous, influential, and listened

to than the declared communists).

8. Communism employs various strategies and trickeries, it uses legal and illegal procedures; it remains silent and conceals the truth; it acts alone, or jointly with any ally who may help achieve its pur-

pose. Its final objective is to dominate the world.

9. Communist strategy has found a new route of approach, taking advantage of the peoples' yearning for independence and desire for peace, and of neutralism and the existence of neutralist blocs, whether or not these are developed under the direction of international communism, in order to attempt to reduce the potential of the free worlds and the communism of the free worlds and the communism of the free worlds are the potential of the free worlds.

The Committee has not considered it necessary, in this initial stage of its work, to examine the measures intended to counteract subversive activities. It considers that, at least for the moment, it has the vast experience acquired through the measures adopted during World War II. However, the Committee does consider it desirable—and an unavoidable duty—owing to the nature and scope of its terms of reference, to point out to the Council of the Organization the urgent need for each and every one of the American governments to give the greatest possible application to the measures that have been adopted since 1948 by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Consultation. As stated above, in the fight against the subversive action of international communism, the American governments in general have not, unfortunately, demonstrated the same zeal and earnestness that they manifested during World War II in fighting Nazi-Fascist subversive action, and perhaps this is one of the reasons for the degree of development of Sino-Soviet and Castro activities in these past few vears.

In connection with the foregoing, it should be noted that, in Resolution VIII, the Fourth Meeting of Consultation (1951) explicitly stated:

Since the said subversive action recognizes no boundaries, the present situation requires, in addition to adequate internal measures, a high degree of international cooperation among the American Republics, looking to the eradication of any threat of subversive activity which may endanger democracy and the free way of life in the American Republics.

It is obvious, therefore, that owing to the methods employed by international communism, the lack of cooperation of one state can render inoperative the measures adopted by a contiguous state; and when several states fail to cooperate, the system for defense against subversion as a whole becomes ineffective. The interdependence of the measures to counternot subversive action is such that if any government fails to apply them, the system is weakened and its entire effectiveness is undermined. This is the impression one receives from sort veving the American scene over the past few years.

Along the same line of thought, the Committee would also illing recommend that, in adopting and applying internal measures in governments act with the necessary vigor which is required to combine subversive action. In making this recommendation, the Committee has kept in mind especially two fundamental considerations; the first is that the agents of international communism, as the Fourth Meeting of Consultation stated, are attempting to destroy the democratic institutions, "utilizing for this purpose the exploitation and the abuse of the search of the search adopted by the competent authorities to counteract the subversive tion, whatever its nature and scope, are not, by any means; inconsistent with the internal and international obligation of the state for the human rights and fundamental liberties.

In connection with this second consideration, the Committee to add that the subversive action of international communications supposes the performance of acts directed, assisted, or instigued foreign powers or governments, and that therefore, they consider grave acts against the public order and the security of the state especially when the agent carrying out the subversive action six mutional or citizen of that state. Under the laws of all the countries of the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties is subject to the limitations and restrictions that the state is expressly authorized to impose for reasons of internal security or other reasons that to impose for reasons of internal security or other reasons that to considered vital to the welfare of the nation. It can be easily sinder stood, therefore, what a legal and political mistake it would be to tolerate subversive activity or fail to combat it adequately, out of fair that human rights and fundamental liberties would not be respected.

The above recommendations and considerations, therefore, are completely consistent with the aim, already expressed in Resolution VIII repeatedly quoted, that in applying the measures referred to, the state

Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents; pp. 1291

should bear in mind "the necessity of guaranteeing and defending by the most efficacious means the rights of the human person as well as their firm determination to preserve and defend the basic democratic institutions of the peoples of the American Republics." On this point, the above-mentioned Pan American Union report 2º states that in its conclusions care was taken to guard "against the possibility that such ways and means be used to obstruct or suppress genuinely democratic expressions of opinion, activities, or political aspirations, completely foreign to international communism." The same legitimate concern appears again in Resolution I.4(c): of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation as one of the basic political principles set forth in that Resolution:

The repudiation of repressive measures which, under the pretext of Isolating or combatting communism, may facilitate the appearance or strengthening of reactionary doctrines and methods which attempt to repress ideas of social progress and to confuse truly progressive and democratic labor organizations and cultural and political movements with communist subversion.

B. Vigilance for the Purpose of Warning Against Acts of Aggression, Subversion, or Other Dangers to Peace and Security, and Self-Defense.

In establishing this Committee, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation resolved:

1. To request the Council of the Organization of American States to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subreviou, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere and to make recommendations to the government of the member states with regard thereto.

In the preamble to Resolution II, it is stated "it is advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council of the Organization of American States a body of an advisory nature". "In this connection, the Committee takes the liberty of offering its technical services to the Council for the purposes outlined in the paragraph cited above. To this effect, the Committee above as takes the liberty of submitting to the Council for consideration its recommendation that the member states be invited to furnish the Council with any information that they may exchange between themselves, pursuant to the resolutions mentioned above, as well as any evidence they obtain regarding communist deception that can be added to the evidence contained in this Report. This information would be examined by the Committee from the purely technical standpoint, in accordance with whatever directives the Council might issue to it, in order that general studies and pertinent recommendations might be submitted to the Council for consideration.

The Committee makes this recommendation having in mind the fact that communist deception and techniques vary constantly, and that only by studying them in a determined, continuous and comparative manner, can conclusions be reached and suggestions made that would

^{*} Strengthening of Internal Scourity (Washington, PAU, 1953) 1 1 51 to the

be of great utility in more effectively combatting communism. In all this, the Committee is fully aware that it is the governments and peoples of America who have the right, capacity, and interest to counteract the subversive action of the international communist movement.

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation also resolved:

3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

In view of the nature and scope of this paragraph of Resolution II, the Committee considers that it would be highly desirable for the General Secretariat to prepare a study of the background of the exercise of individual and collective self-defense, especially with reference to the threats and acts referred to in the said paragraph.

The Committee also deems that it would be very useful to the general objectives of Resolution II if the General Secretariat would issue a new, up-to-date edition of the report on Strengthening of Internal

Security, published in 1953.80